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Trends in Western Advanced Technology

National Intelligence Estimate Volume II—The Estimate



THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Commerce.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

NIE 1-3/5-86/II

TRENDS IN WESTERN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

VOLUME II—THE ESTIMATE

Information available as of 10 March 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 3 April 1986.

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| This Estimate is published in two volumes. Volume I is the Key |
| Judgments. Volume II is a comprehensive discussion of trends in |
| Wastern advanced technologies |

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SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate—the first by the Intelligence Community to analyze Western technologies—assesses status and trends in nine high-technology areas. Assessments of current technology levels are, for the most part, based on demonstrated product performance and manufacturability as well as research achievements. Estimates of future technology levels are based on current technology status, research and development activities, and national technology resources and policy. Data on current and future market size are based on private-sector forecasts and other open source material and are not to be interpreted as intelligence assessments. Market shares and trade flows are considered where appropriate, but are not used as measures of technology capability. This Estimate concentrates on technology, which is a major component of competitiveness. Detailed assessments of the competitive implications of foreign advances in the nine technology areas are beyond the scope of this Estimate and could be the subject of a separate study. Firm conclusions on this subject would require a much more comprehensive treatment of factors other than technology that influence competitiveness.

Foreign technology levels in this Estimate are assessed with respect to levels in the United States. Overall assessments of European technology levels are based on the leading country in Europe rather than an average over all European countries. Technology capabilities of the newly industrializing countries (NICs), although potentially important in determining market share, will continue to be highly dependent on access to advanced technology in the developed countries. Our ability to assess and forecast foreign technology levels is limited by gaps in our information and analytic uncertainties. The Intelligence Community has concentrated its resources on a few key technologies and on those countries developing significant technological and competitive strength. Forecasts of national differences in technology levels are greatly complicated by uncertainties in the impact of government support measures and the amount of international technology diffusion.

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DISCUSSION

Relative Positions and Trends

1. All developed countries recognize the importance of high technology, and both government and industry have programs under way to enhance their technology capabilities (see annex A: National Technology Resources and Strategies). These countries see the level of their technology as critical to their eco-

nomic competitiveness and military capability. Technology levels are increasingly important in determining overall economic success, but other factors such as innovation environment, trade policy, and macroeconomic developments are crucial in determining competitiveness and market share (see inset: Technology, Competition and Economic Impact). The technologies

Technology, Competition, and Economic Impact

Technology—and technological innovation—can be the single most important influence on competitive developments because of its decisive impact on productive capabilities. Because natural resources and other raw materials have economic significance only as a function of technical knowledge, increases in such knowledge are equivalent to an expansion of the resource base of the economy. Technological innovation has often served as a means to overcome resource scarcities by expanding enormously the number and the quality of resources that are capable of being economically exploited.


Technology capability, however, is not the only important factor in international economic competition. There are a number of dimensions, all of which need to be taken into account in assessing the relative competitive strength of firms, industries, or nations. Among these factors are:

- —Corporate financial strengths and weaknesses—
 the financial position of firms can determine their
 ability to undertake necessary investments in capital equipment and R&D, to withstand cyclical
 downturns, to undertake competitive marketing
 strategies, and to aggressively price products.
- —Marketing strategy and tactics—some firms may "target" certain overseas markets, adopting a strategy of sacrificing profit margins in hopes of gaining market share over time; firms in targeted markets that are unable or unwilling to forgo current income in response may be forced to withdraw or be absorbed.
- —Capital investment levels—especially in most high-technology industries, a minimum level of R&D activity is required in order to keep up with competitors and to react to rapid technological changes that can make equipment obsolete before its useful economic life is over.
- -Financial markets and the cost of capital—the relation between a country's financial institutions

- and manufacturers can determine how easily and cheaply its domestic firms acquire funds to finance corporate growth and expansion; the costs of such financing can confer an advantage on those firms by enabling them to undertake more and riskier investment projects than would otherwise be possible.
- —Tax policies—a number of countries adapt their tax systems to allow domestic firms to invest in capital equipment and R&D more cheaply, and to promote demand for their output.
- —Industrial policies and "targeting"—the extent to which governments are willing to support key sectors can influence the state of international competition involving certain critical or rapidly advancing technologies.
- —Regulation of competition—some governments adapt antitrust and other regulatory policies to allow cooperation among rival firms and to exclude foreign competition, in order to organize or "rationalize" production among the domestic industry's largest or most efficient producers.
- —International macroeconomics and exchange rates—monetary and fiscal policies adopted by governments (and their "mix" relative to those in other countries) can shape the competitive environment by influencing interest rates, levels of inflation, and exchange rates, as well as international capital flows.
- —Competitive strategies—apart from marketing strategies adopted by individual firms, the state of international competition in a number of key sectors is determined by the process of governments and industries in several countries making interdependent competitive decisions; the interplay of these competitive strategies may lead either to retaliation or to cooperation from foreign rivals.

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| assessed in this Estimate also have increasingly important military applications, but the level of technology incorporated into military systems is only one of several factors contributing to system effectiveness | 25X1 25X6 | 25X1 |
| 2. The nine technology areas treated in this Estimate are broad, and many of them are interdependent. Semiconductors and advanced structural materials, for example, affect many sectors, and boundaries between telecommunications and data processing are becoming increasingly blurred. Machine tools and robotics technologies are even more pervasive because they impact all manufacturing activities. The following sections summarize foreign status and trends in capability in nine technology sectors. General economic and military impacts are discussed, but detailed assessments of how technology translates into future world market share or military capability is beyond | | |
| the scope of this Estimate | | 25X1 25X1 |
| Semiconductors 3. The semiconductor industry is a small, but vitally important piece of the electronics industry. Semiconductors, particularly integrated circuits (ICs) are used in almost all industrial sectors to increase the performance, capability, and reliability of a large number of products. Total worldwide semiconductor consumption has grown from \$4.4 billion in 1975 to \$28.7 billion in 1984, and industry observers forecast a market of about \$160 billion by 1995. Although the semiconductor industry is a sizable and growing industry in itself, the most important aspect of semiconductor technology is its contribution to other civil and | | |
| defense industries. | 25X1 25X6 | 25X1 |
| | ² We have taken the technical capabilities of US captive suppliers (such as IBM and AT&T that produce semiconductors for their own | 25 X 1 |
| | use) into account when comparing foreign developments with those of the United States. | 25X1 |



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Figure 3. The degree of automation at the Saijo facility—unprecedented in the semiconductor industry—is made possible by special Mitsubishi-designed robots that transport wafer cassettes through the production process. Foreign access to this leading-edge facility has been extremely limited.

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Figure 4


Data Processing: Technology Status/Trends,

Position Relative to the United States

| ► Improving | Lag | | | Parity | Lead | | |
|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|-------|-----------------|
| Maintaining | Sub- stantial | Clear | Slight | With US | Slight | Clear | Sub- stantia |
| ■ Declining | Stantial | | | | | | Stantia |
| Supercomputers | | | | | -15 | | |
| Components | | _ ◀ | | | \triangleright | | |
| Packaging/cooling | | \triangleright | | | | | |
| Architecture | | • | \triangleright | | | | - |
| System software | | ● ^a | \triangleright | | | | |
| Applications software | 0 | | • | | | | |
| General purpose systems | | | | | | | |
| Components | | ◀ | | | 0 | | |
| Packaging/cooling | • | | \triangleright | | | | |
| Architecture | | ● ^a | 0 | | | | |
| System software | | Ò a | | | | | |
| Applications software | | O ^a | ● ^a | | | | |
| Minicomputers microcomputers | | | | | - | | |
| Hardware | | | ⊖a° | | | | |
| Software | | 0 | ● ^a | | | | |
| Peripherals | - | | | | | | |
| Storage | | | ., | | | | - |
| Magnetic | ● ^a | • | | 0 | | | |
| Optical | | | | | • | | |
| Printers | | | | | | | |
| Impact | | ● ^a | | | Oª | | |
| Nonimpact | | ● ^a | | O a | | | - |
| Terminals | | | | | | | |
| Dumb | | | ● ^a | | Oa | | |
| Intelligent | | | □ ^a | | | | |

^a Estimate based on limited data/analysis.


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


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
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| | | 25X1 25X6 25X61 25X6 |
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| ⁴ Microcode is a sequence of elementary steps called micro | Telecommunications 42. The telecommunications industry is undergoing one of the most rapid and extensive periods of change in its history. The industry is modifying employment patterns, consolidating equipment offerings, and requiring increased R&D and capital investment. The primary technological driving forces behind these changes are advances in semiconductors and software that are key technologies for both the communications and computer industries. The functional differences between these two industries' technologies, products, and applications are shrinking rapidly. Both industries are competing to offer a full line of office automation equipment, advanced business systems, and enhanced network services. Efforts to combine microelectronics, computer, and communications capabilities into a single entity are resulting in corporate acquisitions, mergers, alliances, and reorganizations. Most governments are also instituting policies that will have a critical impact on technological capabilities. Political and economic pressures are opening up new markets through liberalization policies and, as a result, the monopolistic alliances between some governments and their principal equipment suppliers are breaking | 25X1 |
| ⁴ Microcode is a sequence of elementary steps called micro- operations that organize and control registers, logic circuits, and data paths to carry out a specific machine language instruction, such as adding or logical comparison. Each machine instruction has its own unique sequence, called a microprogram. | their principal equipment suppliers are breaking down. | 25X1 25X1 25X1 |



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 $\Pi_{\cdot} \Gamma$ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18: CIA-RDP09T00367R000300030001-2 **SECRET** 25X1 25X1 25X6 ZUNI 25X6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Manufacturing: Machine Tools/Robotics 74. Advances in microelectronics have led to a new generation of highly automated, general purpose machine tools with dramatically increased capabilities for commercial and military industrial production (see inset: The Revolution in the Machine Tool Industry). Metalworking industries, including automobiles, aerospace, and shipbuilding are particularly dependent on the machine tool sector, but almost every manufactured product is made on machine tools or on machines that have been built by machine tools. Total 25X1 world production of machine tools was about \$21 billion last year; forecasts for 1995 are about \$50 25X1 billion 75. In contrast to machine tools, the robotics industry is new, and the impact of robotics on national economies is still comparatively slight; worldwide production last year was only \$1.2 billion. The potential, however, is great; in addition to substituting for human labor, robots allow flexibility in automating

manufacturing processes that, when combined with computers and numerically controlled (NC) machine tools, can sharply boost productivity. Moreover, robots' flexibility and reprogrammability features facilitate their use in automated systems for small-batch production; about 70 percent of manufacturing operations are now batch jobs. 25X1 25X1 25X6

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| The Revolution in the Machine Tool Inc | • | | 25 X 6 |
| Machine tools, according to the National Tool Builders Association, are power-driven not supported in the hands of an operator which shape or form metal by any combine cutting, impact, pressure, or electrical technical tools include lathes, drill presses, centers, grinding machines, and forging pressures. | n machines, then in use, bination of niques. Ma- machining | | 25X1 |
| Machine tools are differentiated as numer trolled types and standard or manual machines are equipped control system that operates the machine by ly coded programs fed into the system as purior by playback of prerecorded operating precomputer numerically controlled systems, the based on a microprocessor. Standard maccontrolled by an operator. | chines. Nu- led with a numerical- nched tape rograms. In e control is | | 25 X 1 25 X 1 |
| The application of microprocessors is rec | ducing the | | 207(1 |
| cost and increasing the reliability of machi- systems. The application of microelectronics is also sharply increasing the versatility of One stage in the development of numerically systems—known as direct numerical contricomputer to direct the motions and operation a hundred machine tools simultaneously. | technology machines. controlled rol—uses a | | 25X1 |
| The machining center, with an automatic ter, is one of the significant outgrowths of control. It is a multipurpose machine programeveral operations, such as turning, boring drilling, and tapping, without repositioning the basis of these capabilities, machining opecoming the nucleus of a completely integranufacturing system known as a flexible manufacturing system known as a flexible manufacturing system known as a flexible manufacturing system was a flexible system was a flexib | numerical amed to do g, milling, ne part. On centers are rated parts | | |
| ng system. These systems embrace machin ions, assembly, and in-process inspection, to term to control individual operations and he ultimate goal of a fully automated, | using opera- using com- aiming at | | 25X1 |
| actory. | unnamed | | 25X1 |
| | | | 25X1 25X6 |
| | | | |
| | | | 25 X 1 |
| | world robot pop | a recent industry survey, the Japanese share of oulation stands at 65 percent, compared with United States and 19 percent for Western Euro | 13 ope. |
| | | | 25 X 1 |

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| | | | | | | |
| Figure 12 | | | | | | |
| Manufacturing: Technology Position Relative to the Uni | | | | | | |
| Japan/Europe | | | | | | |
| Improving | Lag | | Parity | Lead | | |
| Maintaining | Sub- Clear | Slight | With . | Slight | Clear | Sub- stantial |
| Declining | stantial | | US | | | Stantiai |
| Machine tools | | | | | | |
| Control | | | • | | 0 | |
| NC/CNC | | | • | | 0 | |
| Sensors | | | 0 | | • | |
| Interfacing | | ⊖a | | | | |
| Structure | | | | • | 0 | |
| Cutting | | | | | | |
| Forming | | | 0 | • | | |
| Supporting elements | | 0 | | | | |
| Robotics | | | | | | |
| Mechanical | | | • | | 0 | |
| Control | | | | ⊖ a | | |
| Language | | 0 | | - | | |

Interfacing

Vision

Others

Sensors

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0


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^a Estimate based on limited data/analysis.

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


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